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I. Introduction
The purpose of this research guide is to provide the inquirer with
an exhaustive list of sources by which one may grasp the intricacies
of subject matter jurisdictional "rules" that have developed between
Native American tribal courts and their state and federal counterparts.
This work focuses solely on whether a tribal, federal, or state tribunal
has either original, exclusive, or concurrent subject matter jurisdiction
to hear causes of action involving Native American interests.
In Security State Bank v. Pierre,' one state court noted,
In view of the complexity of jurisdiction questions involving
Indian reservations and the number of cases that this Court
is receiving, we will detail the stipulated facts with the
thought that somewhere in the federal appellate process the
final authority will be able to more clearly understand the
perplexity of state jurisdictional problems and the near
impossibility of their solution due to prior federal decisional
case law. 2
Jurisdictional clarity within the tribal/federal relationship is an equally
illusive commodity given the inconsistent and perplexing case law
1. 511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973).




alluded to above and the interplay of individual treaties, general federal
legislation, and tribe specific federal statutes. The recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Duro v. Reina3 and the legislation 4 enacted to counter
the Court's holding represents the dynamic nature of this area of law.
The unique status of the relationship between the federal government
and the Indian nations has provided the animus for the germination
of this complex body of law. In order to reconcile the existence of
disparate jurisdictional findings, one must, as a threshold considera-
tion, realize that Congress has assumed plenary power over Indian
affairs.' Consequently, Congress has directed the destiny of Indian
nations in conformity with prevailing political sentiments reflecting, in
many instances, hostility to the continued existence of tribal nations.
Despite the subservient position of Indian tribes, Indian nations are
viewed as independent sovereigns whose internal power does not flow
from the federal government. Essentially, the tribes remain separate
peoples in control of their own internal affairs, yet subject to Congress
which functions as guardian and overseer.
The major variables contributing to the current "maze" of the
jurisdictional framework have been the shifting policies of the United
States Congress coupled with surprising Supreme Court decisions that
appear to defy the logic of prior holdings. As congressional policy
toward Native Americans has vacillated, so has the legislation enacted
to realize those policies. Throughout the tribal/United States relation-
ship, Congress has attempted to, in varying degrees, either affirm the
sovereign nature of the tribes and thereby encourage the viability of
the tribal nations, or initiate policies aimed at assimilating Indians into
the mainstream of American society. During the period in which
Congress focused primarily on the recognition of tribal entities, leg-
islation emphasized excluding jurisdiction of the federal and state
courts over actions occurring on Indian lands. Conversely, legislation
promulgated during an assimilative era was directed at maximizing
state and federal jurisdiction, sometimes nearly negating tribal juris-
diction.
Initially, Congress and the federal judiciary affirmed and encouraged
the independent status of Indian tribes through treaties and confirming
case law. 6 However, the late 1800s presented significant challenges to
the continued viability of the Indian nations. During this time, Con-
3. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
4. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1852 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. III
1991)).
5. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that
Congress has the power to abrogate treaties unilaterally); Crain v. First Nat'l Bank,
324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that Congress may negate tribal status on its own
motion).
6. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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gress initiated an "allotment" program designed to grant reservation
land to individual Indians and, in time, subject them to the same laws
and responsibilities as other United States citizens.7 The realization of
this policy resulted in the substantial diminution of Indian country
and a disenfranchisement of Indian communities. Congress reversed
this policy in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act8 but then
returned to this hostile stance in the 1950s by adopting a policy of
"termination," whereby Indian tribes were disbanded and their lands
sold. During this era, Public Law 280 was passed, 9 granting certain
states, and affording other states, the option to unilaterally secure
jurisdiction over disputes arising in Indian country. However, in the
late 1960s congressional policy changed again. Congress decided to
reaffirm the independence of Indian nations and consequently passed
legislation reflecting this attitude, including provisions allowing for the
retrocession of jurisdiction previously acquired under Public Law 280
and by requiring tribal consent to state exercise of broad-based juris-
diction. Substantive embodiments of this congressional reaffirmance
of the integrity of tribal self-governance and cultural viability may
also be found in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assis-
tance Act of 197410 and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.I
One predictable manifestation of contemporary congressional philos-
ophy has been the concomitant reaffirmation of the viability of tribal
courts as appropriate forums for the resolution of disputes. 2 These
acts reflect the "current" congressional perspective, but history cau-
tions against relying upon the continued vitality of this stance. Nev-
ertheless, this checkerboard history has provided a myriad of
jurisdictional statutes, treaties, and case law that reflect the vagaries
of the times in which they were instituted.
Despite the fact that resolution of a specific jurisdictional question
may be an arduous task, general parameters have emerged. Federal
statutory law (post-1871) and the case law interpreting this body of
law have provided direction, and lack thereof, for discerning which
tribunals have jurisdiction over which causes of action. Given the
complexity of the subject matter, this guide, along with the requisite
examination of the federal statutes and federal case law, relies heavily
upon law review articles that examine the various areas of jurisdiction
7. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1988)).
8. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988)).
9. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-62, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. 1360 (1988)).
10. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
11. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
12. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (amended to allow jurisdiction over all "Indians").
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in detail. Examination of the federal statutes will provide the broad
foundation of the inquiry, and the lav review articles and case law
will, it is hoped, guide the researcher in solving the specific jurisdic-
tional query.
A competent search for the correct jurisdictional "answer" will, in
most instances, require that the researcher answer the following thresh-
old queries:
(1) Where did the cause of action/offense occur (within
or outside of Indian country)?
(2) What is the racial status of the plaintiff/victim?
(3) If the cause of action involves a reservation Indian,
is that party a member of that reservation or a member of
another tribe?
(4) What is the subject matter of the suit?
(5) Are there any extant treaties in force that define the
jurisdictional bounds of the instant case (not likely given
the "last in time" rule that provides priority to the last
enacted between treaties/federal slatutes in case of conflict-
ing standards)?
(6) Is there a specific federal statute conferring jurisdiction
to the state where the cause of action arose (besides Public
Law 280)?
(7) Was the state afforded jurisdiction, or did the state
assume jurisdiction, under Public Law 280?
(8) If jurisdiction was acquired by the state under Public
Law 280, did the state subsequently retrocede this acquisi-
tion?
(9) Is there a tribal code that either confers or denies
jurisdiction in the tribal court over this cause of action or
as to these parties?
Further considerations involve the ramifications of filing in alternate
forums where concurrent jurisdiction is present (conflict of law con-
cerns, etc.), whether service of process has to be performed in Indian
country, and, if successful, will execution of the judgments occur in
Indian country? Delineation of the factors involved in solving a juris-
dictional puzzle underscores the fact specific nature of this endeavor.
The measure of jurisdictional autonomy accorded Indian nations
has corresponded to the level of sovereignty recognized by Congress.
Due to the intertwined nature of the subject matter, a section presenting
law reviews on this topic has been included in the "overview" mate-
rials.
Given the confusion generated by inconsistency within the federal
legislature and judiciary, an overview of the history of tribal/United
States jurisdictional development is provided. This section is critical
No. 1]
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to comprehension of the development of the subject matter and there-
fore should not be dismissed lightly. The statutes and case law pre-
sented in this section have formed the bases of the jurisdictional bounds
at issue, and comprehension of their development will aid the re-
searcher in understanding what, at first impression, appear to be
irreconcilable jurisdictional determinations.
Hopefully, this guide will provide the researcher with the resources
necessary to clarify what has been, and remains to be, a dynamic and
variable field of law.
II. Definitions, Overview Materials
A. Definitions
1. Indian
Curiously, though legislation has been proposed, no federal statute
defines who occupies the status of "Indian" for general jurisdictional
purposes. However, definitions of "Indian" exist in other contexts
and these may be helpful, arguably analogized, for the purpose of
constructing a definition for jurisdictional purposes.
Sanapaw v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). Sanapaw
addressed whether the circuit court had concurrent subject matter
jurisdiction in an action by an enrolled member of the Menominee
Indian Tribe and a tribal employer to recover from another tribal
member for damage sustained in an off reservation assault. The con-
trolling consideration here revolved around whether the defendant was
a "non-Indian" for jurisdictional purposes at the time the action was
commenced. The court reasoned that the relevant factors for deter-
mining an individual's status include racial status, habits and lifestyle,
and one's place of residence.
Law anrd Order on Indian Reservations - Jurisdiction, 25 C.F.R. §
11.2(c) (1989). This regulation defines "Indian" for the purpose of
jurisdiction before the Court of Indian Offenses as "any person of
Indian descent who is a member of any recognized Indian tribe now
under federal jurisdiction . ... "
25 U.S.C. § 345 (1988) - for land allotment purposes.
25 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) - for educational allotments.
25 C.F.R. § 32.1 (1989) - for educational benefits.
25 C.F.R. § 34.3 (1989) - for vocational training.
Ex Prte Pero, 99 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1938); People v. Carmen, 273
P.2d 521, 525 (1954). These cases employed a totality of the circum-
stances approach to whether "Indian" status attaches.
See also section II.K.3, Jurisdiction over Nonmember Indians Within
Indian Country, in this guide.
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21 Words and Phrases 290-94 (1964) - further cases defining "In-
dian."
2. Indian Country
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) - definition of Indian country.
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 243 (1913). Donnelly
defined Indian country as including not only lands which were origi-
nally possessed by Native Americans, but also land lawfully set aside
for Indians out of the public domain which were not previously
occupied by Indians.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913). The Court found
that even land held in communal fee simple ownership by the Pueblo
Indians was considered Indian land for the purpose of subjecting the
land to legislation promulgated by the United States Congress.
Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280, 286-87 (8th Cir. 1967).
The Eighth Circuit held that land remains Indian country for federal
jurisdictional purposes even when the land in question was owned by
a non-Indian where the site was within the original borders of the
reservation.
Marvin J. Sonosky, State Jurisdiction Over Indians in Indian Coun-
try, 48 N.D.L. Rev. 551 (1972). The author focuses on cases inter-
preting which land encompasses "Indian Country" for jurisdictional
purposes.
21 Words and Phrases 294-305 (1964) - further cases defining
"Indian Country."
3. Indian Tribe
William W. Quinn, Jr., "Federal Acknowledgment of American
Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. § 83,"
17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37 (1992). Quinn discusses which segment of
the federal government has power to confer tribal status, as well as
the process and the prerequisites for tribal recognition.
L.R. Weatherhead, "What is an 'Indian Tribe' - The Question of
Tribal Existence," 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1 (1980). The author discusses
the requisites of tribal designation.
United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981). The
Ninth Circuit held that merely claiming that one's ancestors were
members of a tribe that signed a treaty is not sufficient to confer
tribal status. There needs to be evidence of a continuous, distinct, and
cohesive Indian cultural or political community for Indian tribe status
to attach.
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979).
The First Circuit held that given the disparate circumstances confront-
ing groups of Native Americans throughout the United States, a broad
and flexible definition of Indian tribe must be maintained. Addition-
No. 11
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ally, a liberal construction of which groups comprise Indian tribes is
warranted where federal benefits and protections are concerned. How-
ever, here the plaintiff Indian tribe has the burden of proving its
existence as a tribe where the plaintiff is asserting that tribal land was
taken illegally.
Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370 (1st Cir. 1975). The First Circuit held that federal recognition as
a tribe is not a prerequisite to tribal status under the Federal Nonin-
tercourse Act. 3 Here, the State of Maine had recognized this group
as a tribe for various purposes.
25 C.F.R. § 83 (1989) - presents criteria to "establish" tribal status
for tribes that have not previously been officially recognized by the
federal government.
21 Words and Phrases 308-10 (1964) - contains cases defining
"Indian tribe."
4. The Five Civilized Tribes
This phrase refers to the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw,
and Seminole nations.
B. Statistics; Population, Reservation Acreage, Major Tribes by
State, Etc.
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1989, at 417 (Merle S.
Hoffman ed. 1989). The Almanac gives statistics as delineated above
concerning existing tribes.
United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States tbl. 34, at 31 (105th ed. 1985) - states that Indians
comprise 1,420,400 of the total United States population of 226,546,000.
Thus, Indians are approximately .62% of the U.S. population.
C. Treatises Addressing Policy and Jurisdictional Ramifications
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Five Rings 1986)
(reprint of Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942). Cohen was the
foremost authority of his time on Indian law and policy. Contemporary
policies and the shaping of jurisdictional bounds were, in part, a
reflection of his influence. This work provides a comprehensive and
enduring: overview of Indian law through the date of the original's
first printing in 1942.
Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Rennard Strick-
land et al. eds., 1982). This edition is an update and complete revision
of Cohen's 1942 Handbook. The 1982 edition adopts a philosophy
similar to the original Handbook, although the content and format
are completely different.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
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Linda Medcalf, Law and Identity: Lawyers, Native Americans, and
Legal Practice (1978). Medcalf's book is primarily concerned with
prevailing attitudes and the manner in which various viewpoints im-
pinge upon the attorney/Indian relationship and the realization of
Native American legal objectives. Chapters 3 and 5 apply to the instant
subject matter in that the author undertakes this discussion in the
context of "The Quest for Sovereignty" and "The Native American
Bill of Rights" respectively.
Samuel J. Brakel, American Indian Tribal Courts: The Costs of
Separate Justice (1978). Brakel presents a brief history of the history
and jurisdiction of tribal courts and then proceeds to examine specific
tribal legal systems (Standing Rock, Navajo, Blackfeet). He concludes
with recommendations for maximizing the efficacy of tribal court
systems.
D. Casebooks
Robert N. Clinton, Nell J. Newton & Monroe E. Price, American
Indian Law (3rd ed. 1991) - latest cases and materials.
David H. Getches & Charles F. Wilkinson, Cases on Federal Indian
Law (2d ed. 1986). Getches and Wilkinson cover the full gamut of
Indian law including the requisite jurisdictional section. This work is
best suited to the law student/attorney, given the casebook format.
E. Nutshell[s]
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell (2d ed.
1988). Canby follows the traditional "nutshell" format in presenting
the "essence" of the law in issue. This work contains a historical
overview providing a concise, though somewhat cursory, presentation
of the development of United States government policy and its con-
sequent effect upon the jurisdictional bounds between the tripartite
system of tribunals. The work dedicates substantial resources to the
division of jurisdiction as currently understood and is most helpful as
a quick reference guide to the basic jurisdictional "rules." Particularly
helpful in this regard are the jurisdictional charts presenting a general
breakdown of criminal and civil jurisdiction on pages 142 and 170
respectively.
F. Professional Manuals
American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc., Manual of Indian
Law (4th ed. 1978). This manual provides a concise recitation of
jurisdictional bounds as understood through the date of publication.
All propositions are supported by case law; therefore, it is especially
suited for law students and attorneys. Given the concise format, this
work is helpful as a quick reference source.
No. 1]
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G. Reporter
Indian Law Reporter (Am. Indian Law. Training Program). Pub-
lished since 1973, this reporter is an extremely useful tool in providing
contemporary updates on relevant legislation and cases. Volumes are
bound by year, with a complete index, and are found in most law
libraries.
H. Law Review Symposiums on Indian Law Involving
Jurisdictional Materials
"Indian Law Symposium," 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 191-446 (1989).
"Symposium on Indian Law," 54 Wash. L. Rev. 475-668 (1979).
"Indian Law Forum," 22 Kan. L. Rev. 337-487 (1974).
Symposium, 33 Mont. L. Rev. 187-320 (1972).
Symposium, 48 N.D. L. Rev. 529-750 (1972).
Symposium, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 553-755 (1968).
I. Tribal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
1. United States
Clifford M. Lytle, Comment, "The Supreme Court, Tribal Sover-
eignty and Continuing Problems of State Encroachment Into Indian
Country," 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 65 (1980). This comment stresses the
seminal cases affecting a state's capacity to assert jurisdiction in Indian
country.
Stephen Lafferty, Comment, "Tribal Sovereignty and the Claims of
Non-Indians Under the Indian Civil Rights Act," 9 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 289 (1981). The author explores the ability, or lack thereof, of
a non-Indian plaintiff to sue an Indian tribe by claiming that the tribe
contravened rights guaranteed under the Indian Civil Rights Act in the
aftermath of seeming tribal immunity protection afforded by Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.
14
S.J. Bloxham, "Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Montana v.
United States," 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 175 (1980). 1 loxham takes issue
with the holding in Montana whereby the state is afforded regulation
of hunting/fishing rights involving non-Indians on reservation land.
Frank Pommersheim, "The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Is-
sues of Tribal Jurisdiction," 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 329 (1989). Pommer-
sheim discusses the jurisdictional implications of Nat'l Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe5 and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante16,
which affirm tribal courts as the primary forums for adjudication of
14. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
15. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
16. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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civil actions that arise in Indian country, in that one must exhaust
tribal court remedies once a suit has been filed in tribal court. A party
cannot circumvent a tribal proceeding merely by filing concurrently in
federal court. The author notes language in Iowa Mutual contending
that "tribal authority over activities of non-Indians on reservation land
is an important part of tribal sovereignty.' ' 7 This commentator sug-
gests that the scope of tribal court jurisdiction in civil matters involving
non-Indians has been extended given the decisions above, and he
presents an analytical framework for discerning whether the tribal
court has jurisdiction to hear a particular suit focusing on subject
matter, personal, and territorial jurisdictional issues.
2. Canada
Wilcomb Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law: A Study
of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian (1971). Part
IV, section 5 addresses the status of Canadian Indians.
Richard H. Bartlett, "The Indian Act of Canada," 27 Buffalo L.
Rev. 581, 603-08 (1978). The author traces the historical relationships
between the 565 bands of native peoples of Canada with the govern-
ment of Canada. Within this discussion, the pages cited above address
the jurisdictional bases that have emerged.
J. Law Reviews Providing Jurisdictional Overview
1. Generally
James E. Murphy, Note, "Jurisdiction: The McBratney Decisions -
A Pattern of Inconsistency," 3 Am. Indian L. Rev. 149 (1975). The
author discusses the manner in which, historically and contemporarily,
the decision in McBratney has been used to assert state court jurisdic-
tion in Indian country.
Kent Frizzell, "Evolution of Jurisdiction in Indian Country," 22
Kan. L. Rev. 341 (1974). This article provides a brief historical over-
view and examines the policy presumptions and legislation of the Nixon
presidency.
Indian Civil Rights Task Force, Comment, "Development of Tri-
partite Jurisdiction in Indian Country," 22 Kan. L. Rev. (1974). This
comment catalogues and discusses the seminal cases and legislation
that have shaped contemporary jurisdiction through 1974.
Wiliam H. Kelly, "Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian
Affairs," 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 559 (1968). Kelly provides a general history
of Indian affairs from the resettlement period of the late 1800s through
1968. The article is helpful in gaining a sense of the various paths
17. Id. at 18.
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taken by the federal government in its attempt to define its relationship
to, and the continued viability of, Indian nations. A rudimentary grasp
of the vacillations of federal policy is critical to understanding the
jurisdictional inconsistencies.
Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Briggs, "The Evolution of the
Termination Policy," 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 139 (1977). The authors
chronicle the policy and effects of the termination era, during which
time 109 tribes were terminated and, therefore, ceased to exist as legal
entities.
Nell Jessup Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations," 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984). Newton
provides extensive coverage of the power relationships between the
United States and tribal entities with significant devotion to jurisdic-
tional issues.
Karl J. Kramer, Comment, "The Most Dangerous Branch: An
Institutfional Approach to Understanding the Role of the Judiciary in
American Indian Jurisdictional Determinations," 1986 Wis. L. Rev.
989. This comment argues that United States Supreme Court decisions
affecting jurisdiction over Indian matters and parties reflect a sensitiv-
ity to the political climate and the degree to which tribal activities
impinge upon non-Indian interests and persons adjoining Indian coun-
try. The author proffers statistical data to bolster his hypothesis.
Philip Lee Fetzer, "Jurisdictional Decisions in Indian Law: The
Importance of Extralegal Factors in Judicial Decision Making," 9 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 253 (1981). Fetzer proffers, in the absence of other
justifiable criteria to explain inconsistent decisions on Indian jurisdic-
tional questions, correlations between "outside" influences and juris-
dictional holdings. Compare with Comment, "The Most Dangerous
Branch: An Institutional Approach to Understanding the Role of the
Judiciary in American Indian Jurisdictional Determinations," 1986
Wis. L. Rev. 989.
2. Criminal Jurisdiction
William V. Vetter, "A New Corridor For The Maze: Tribal Criminal
Jurisdiction and Nonmember Indians," 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 349
(1992). Vetter analyzes criminal jurisdiction through examination of
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Duro. The article emphasizes that while new
congressional legislation will subject nonmember Indians to jurisdic-
tion, non-Indians are exempt.
Kevin Meisner, Comment, "Modern Problems of Criminal Jurisdic-
tion in Indian Country," 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 175 (1992). This
overview was written prior to the Supreme Court decision in Duro;
however, an addendum to the comment offers options for dealing with
nonmember crimes on the reservation in light of Duro.
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Robert N. Clinton, "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective," 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 951 (1975).
The author competently provides extensive treatment of the history of
criminal jurisdiction from 1776 through 1975. Major headings of the
article are as follows: "The Treaty Period: 1776-1871," "The Statutory
Period: 1871-Date," "Indian Criminal Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court: The 19th Century Experience," "Crow Dog and Kagama:
Jurisdiction Over Intra-Indian Crime," and "Jurisdictional Problems
in the Late 19th Century." Clinton observes the complex, noninte-
grated manner in which this body of law has unfolded. See also
Clinton's followup article, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:
A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze," 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503
(1976).
Tim Vollman, Comment, "Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Tribal Sovereignty and Defendant's Rights in Conflict," 22 Kan. L.
Rev. 387 (1974). The author discusses the right, or lack thereof, of
Indian defendants to receive jury instructions on, or to plead to, lesser
included offenses in federal court under Keeble v. United States.'$
Charles T. DuMars, Comment, "Indictment Under the Major Crimes
Act - An Exercise in Unfairness and Unconstitutionality," 10 Ariz.
L. Rev. 696 (1968). The author argues that Indians receive unfair
treatment under the act for various reasons including, among other
considerations, differing standards for the proof of evidence contingent
upon where, within the same reservation, the act occurred.
Larry A. Burns, Note, "Criminal Jurisdiction: Double Jeopardy in
Indian Country," 6 Am. Indian L. Rev. 395 (1978). The author
describes the potential for double jeopardy given the ramifications of
United States v. Wheeler,19 where an Indian was convicted of disorderly
conduct by a tribal court and subsequently charged, in the federal
courts, in reference to the same incident, with carnal knowledge of a
female under the age of 16.
Noma D. Gurich & R. Steven Haught, Note, "Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Indian Schools: Chilocco Indian School, An Example of Juris-
dictional Confusion," 6 Am. Indian L. Rev. 217 (1978). The author
discusses the complexities of criminal jurisdiction over Indian schools
in general with special focus on the peculiarities of the Chilocco Indian
School in Oklahoma.
3. Civil Jurisdiction
Sandra Hansen, "Survey of Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country
1990," 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. (1991). Hansen provides a historical
introduction which leads into a discussion of the basics of civil juris-
18. 412 U.S. 205 (1973).
19. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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diction, involving a wide spectrum of interests including divorce, chil-
dren, probate, water rights, taxation, etc.
Allison M. Dussais, Note, "Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Civil
Disputes Involving Non-Indians: An Assessment of National Farmers
Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians and a Proposal for Reform,"
20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 217 (1986). The author argues for increased
jurisdiction power for tribal courts in this area, proposing a procedure
which utilizes the Department of Interior, whereby a tribe could apply
for exclusive jurisdiction over certain, reservation-based civil causes of
action.
William C. Canby, Jr., "Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reser-
vation," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 206. Canby, author of American Indian
Law in a Nutshell, summarizes jurisdictional issues arising within
Indian country through 1973.
John F. Sullivan, Comment, "State Civil Power Over Reservation
Indians," 33 Mont. L. Rev. 291 (1972). This comment explains state
jurisdiction over civil actions when the events precipitating the cause
of action occur on Indian land and one of the parties is an Indian.
James L. Huemoeller, Note, "State Jurisdiction on Indian Reser-
vations, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463 (1976)," 13 Land & Water L.'Rev. 1035 (1978). This commentator
traces state/tribal court jurisdictional history and explores the impli-
cations of Moe. The author asserts that allowing states to require
Indians to tax non-Indian customers on cigarette sales and authorizing
the states to collect the taxes withheld signals a breakdown in the
burgeoning reassertion of Indian sovereignty that has seen a diminution
of the imposition of state jurisdiction in Indian country.
4. Jurisdiction Over Juveniles
Joseph E. Mudd, "Indian Juveniles and Legislative Delinquency in
Montana," 33 Mont. L. Rev. 233, 236-39 (1972). The author gives a
brief overview of state court jurisdiction involving Indians generally
and applies this scheme to Indian juvenile defendants.
Michael J. O'Brien, Comment, "Children: Indian Juveniles in the
State and Tribal Courts of Oregon," 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 343 (1977).
This comment discusses jurisdictional questions in juvenile matters,
but its dominant focus is a comparative study of Indian juvenile
criminal behavior in-Oregon (comparing various Indian reservations,
Oregon non-Indian juveniles, and juveniles in the United States gen-
erally). See also Blackwolf v. District Court, 158 Mont. 523, 493 P.2d
1293 (Mont. 1972). The Blackwolf court held that the juvenile court
did not have jurisdiction over alleged acts of delinquency by enrolled
Indians within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, despite the
fact that the tribal court had "remanded" the proceedings to juvenile
court pursuant to a reservation code provision. This holding was
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premised upon the fact that the state had not accepted jurisdiction
through affirmative legislation and the requisite special tribal election.
See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988).
K. Ancillary Considerations
1. Service of Process
Exercise of subject matter jurisdiction is obviously hampered if
service of process may not be obtained over the parties to the suit.
This question arises regarding the viability of service of process issued
by a state court against Indian defendants living within Indian country.
Courts have split on the question.
Compare State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 506 P.2d 786 (N.M.
1973) (service of process within Indian country upheld) with Francisco
v. State, 556 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1976) (service in Indian country invalid).
In Francisco v. State, 556 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1976), an Indian petitioner
brought a special action to determine whether the state court abused
its discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, on grounds
of lack of personal jurisdiction, an action brought against him by the
State in the name of an Indian woman to determine the petitioner's
alleged paternity of the woman's child. The court held that the State
had no authority to extend application of its laws to the Indian
reservation which had been set aside, by executive order, for the
exclusive use and occupancy of the Indian tribe. The court's holding
was based on the fact that the State had neither amended its consti-
tution nor passed appropriate legislation to confer upon itself juris-
diction over the reservation pursuant to Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,20 nor had the State acquired the requisite consent of the Indian
tribe to do so. Therefore, the deputy sheriff was without authority to
make services of process while validly within the boundaries of the
reservation. See also Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 401-406, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988).
2. Enforcement of Judgments
The power of a particular tribunal to hear a cause of action is
likewise emasculated if the judgments issued as a result of suit are not
enforceable. Again, this situation arises when enforcement of state
court judgments is attempted on the reservation. The courts are split
on this issue.
Compare Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 555 P.2d 211 (Mont.
1977) (enforcement was permitted) with Annis v. Dewey County Bank,
335 F. Supp. 113 (D.S.D. 1971) (enforcement was denied).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
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3. Jurisdiction Over Non-Member Indians Within Indian Country
Indians from another tribe that reside on a reservation historically
have been accorded, for jurisdictional purposes, a status commensurate
with the other members of that reservation. However, recent devel-
opments have now clouded this previously clear line.
See section II(J)(2) of this pathfinder for law review articles ad-
dressing criminal activity of nonmembers or non-Indians on reservation
property.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserva-
tion, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The Court allowed a state tax upon non-
member Indians purchasing commodities on the reservation.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Language in the
Court's opinion continually referred to tribal jurisdiction over its
"members." The scope encompassed by the assertion of state court
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is, to date, in transition.
Karl J. Erhart, Comment, "Jurisdiction Over Non-Member Indians
on Reservations," 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 727. The author utilizes treaties,
statutes, and the equal protection clause to conclude that, for juris-
dictional. purposes, non-member Indians on reservations should be
treated like non-Indians.
4. Conflict of Laws
The exercise of jurisdiction may become an empty source of power
if the legal framework of a foreign legal system is imposed upon one's
tribunal. This concern is particularly relevant for tribal courts when
customary law departs, in many instances, from the legal bases in state
and federal courts.
Kevin Gover, Note, "Jurisdiction: Conflict of Law and the Indian
Reservation: Solutions to Problems in Indian Civil Jurisdiction," 8
Am. Indian L. Rev. 361 (1980). The author devotes most of his article
to a discussion of subject matter and personal jurisdiction suggesting,
inter alia, that tribal codes need to be updated to assert jurisdiction
over non-Indians where appropriate, and states need to accept/define
areas where exclusive tribal jurisdiction resides.
Catherine B. Stetson, Note, "Conflict of Laws: The Plurality of
Legal Systems: An Analysis of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, The Indian Child
Welfare Act," 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 333 (1980). The author acknowl-
edges the multi-system (federal/tribal/state) influences that shaped the
Child Welfare Act, while pointing out clarifications and further am-
biguities presented by promulgation of the legislation.
John T. Mashier, Comment, "Conflicts Between State and Tribal
Law; The Application of Full Faith and Credit Legislation to Indian
Tribes," 1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 801. The author uses the Uniform Com-
mercial 'Code and tribal commercial laws to argue that tribal laws in
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such matters should be given full faith and. credit. The author relies
on the statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) to buttress his
argument.
See also Robert Berk, Note, "Indian Law - State Preempted From
Enforcing its Hunting and Fishing Regulations Against Non-Indians
on the Reservation - New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103
S.Ct. 2378 (1983)," 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 191. This note gives a historical
overview by way of case law wherein tribal and state law have con-
flicted concerning reservation hunting and fishing regulations address-
ing non-Indians on the reservation. The author explains the balancing
test that has emerged to discern which law prevails and discusses the
application of this test by the United States Supreme Court in Mes-
calero.
5. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies
The exercise of jurisdiction is meaningless if a party can bring the
same action in another court system and thereby circumvent the orig-
inal proceeding. In Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,21 the federal
court refused to hear a diversity case when a commensurate action
was pending in the tribal court. The plaintiff (defendant in the tribal
court) was required to exhaust the remedies available in the tribal
court system before seekirig relief in the federal system.22 This deference
to the tribal system, where an Indian is suing a non-Indian, is arguably
transferable to the state context as well. However, the Court's language
in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering casts doubt on this application.
L. Treaties
Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties (1904) -
the definitive compilation on the subject.
M. Tribal Courts
The exercise of jurisdiction obviously assumes that there exists an
appropriate judicial system through which to process the jurisdiction.
Judicial systems reflect the cultural makeup of the society in which
they function. Not surprisingly, tribal court laws and procedures reflect
the disparity between the cultural foundations of mainstream America
and the Indian nations. The following materials reflect issues that have
arisen at a time when tribal courts are gaining more recognition and
responsibility.
21. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
22. Id.
23. 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984) (Fort Berthold 1).
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Chief Justice Tom Tso, "The Process of Decision Making in Tribal
Courts," 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 225 (1989). Chief Justice Tso concentrates
on the Navajo tribal court system; the court's organization and inde-
pendence from Navajo political influence is stressed. Tso also engages
in a comparative scrutiny of Navajo customary law and the Anglo-
American counterpart.
M. Allen Core, Note, "Tribal Sovereignty: Federal Court Review
of Tribal Court Decisions - Judicial Intrusion into Tribal Sover-
eignty," 13 Am. Indian L. Rev. 175 (1988). The author traces federal
case law that has both upheld and defeated tribal court jurisdiction.
This note contends that tribal sovereignty is intruded upon when federal
courts circumvent the tribal court system.
Jesse C. Trentadue, "Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Collection Suits
by Local Merchants and Lenders: An Obstacle to Credit for Reser-
vation Indians?," 13 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1 (1987). Along with a
concise delineation of the significant legislation that has defined the
tripartite (United States/tribal/state) jurisdictional relationship, this
article discusses attorney and creditor perceptions of the tribal court
system. The author uses North Dakota's experience to draw the con-
clusion that Indians are being denied extension of substantive credit
and developmental funds due to the perceptions and realities of liti-
gation in tribal courts in the instance of default.
Gordon K. Wright, Note, "Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions
in State Courts," 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1397 (1985). The author argues
that full faith and credit should be granted to tribal court decisions
(two states already do) conditioned upon institution of certain reform
measures.
Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The Discourses of Sovereignty in Indian
Country," 11 Indian L. Support Center Rep., Sept. 1988, at 1. This
article supports the idea that tribal courts will function to define the
future of Indian tribal sovereignty.
25 C.F.R. §§ 11.22, 11.22c (1992) - sets forth the BIA [Bureau of
Indian Affairs] Code for the Courts of Indian Offenses. The Code
recommends that jurisdiction over non-Indians attach only by stipu-
lation of the parties.
Peter W. Birkett, Note, "Indian Tribal Courts and Procedural Due
Process: A Different Standard?," 49 Ind. L.J. 721 (1974). The author
addresses the disparity between due process protections afforded under
the United States Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968. See also Note, "The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional
Status of Tribal Governments," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1969).
Michael N. Deegan, Note, "Closing the Door to Federal Court -
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)," 14 Land &
Water L. Rev. 625 (1979). The author examines the reaffirmation of
tribal court dominion over intertribal disputes. In Martinez, the federal
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courts refused jurisdiction to hear a tribal membership dispute despite
the fact that the cause of action was allegedly violative of the Indian
Civil Rights Act.
Tiane L. Sommer, Note, "Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies Required
for Habeas Corpus Review Under the Indian Civil Rights Act," 11
Am. Indian L. Rev. 57 (1983). This note argues in favor of the
exhaustion of tribal remedies section incorporated into this act.
N. Encyclopedias
42 C.J.S. Indians §§ 1, 2, 67, 72, 75, 79, 85-87 (1944). These sections
include definitions of Indian and Indian land as well as civil and
criminal jurisdiction in the various court systems.
41 Am. Jur. 2d Indians §§ 14, 15, 16, 55-58, 60, 139-42, 157, 158,
160-62 (1968). This set provides the same basic treatment as C.J.S.,
but has a seperate section on tribal courts.
Ill. Public Law 280
A. Introduction
The initial enactment of Public Law 2804 expressly granted criminal
and civil jurisdiction over Indians within Indian country to five states;z
Alaska was subsequently added by amendment. This act also allowed
any other state to assume jurisdiction over Indian land within the
state's borders.26 This substantial transfer of power was legitimized
under Congress' plenary power to regulate Indian affairs, and Indian
consent to the assumption was not required. Dissatisfaction with the
implementation of the act emerged within the states given the prospect
of enforcing jurisdiction in Indian country without the benefit of
revenues from the reservation to fund the effort. Likewise, there was
predictable indignation expressed by the Indian nations at the relin-
quishment of jurisdictional power without their consent.27 Conse-
quently, fifteen years later, Congress revised the act with provisions
allowing the states to retrocede jurisdiction back to the federal gov-
ernment and providing stipulations that any further assumption of
jurisdiction would be premised upon the consent of the Indian nation
in issue.2 Understandably, there have been no assumptions of juris-
24. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988) (civil jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) (criminal jurisdiction).
25. California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988).
27. See Hearing on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235 and H.R. 3264 Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on State Legal
Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 11 at 14 (1952) (statement of
Frank George, First Vice President, National Congress of American Indians).
28. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1988).
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diction since the 1968 revisions. The mere fact that jurisdiction was
granted under this statute, much less the conflicting jurisprudence
delineating the exact scope of this grant, has contributed to the current
legal maze.
Research of a jurisdictional question necessarily entails inquiry into
whether the state in question has been granted, or has retroceded,
jurisdiction under the relevant statute. To complicate matters further,
Congre;s has also legislated specific grants of jurisdiction over Indians
to states through isolated statutes.
Carole E. Goldberg, "Public Law 280: The Limits of State Juris-
diction Over Reservation Indians," 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535 (1975). The
author speaks to the implications of state assumption of jurisdiction
under Public Law 280, including the financial burdens placed upon
the state in the instance of acceptance. Resources also are dedicated
to an examination of case law that has defined the jurisdictional bounds
conferred under the statute.
B. States Granted Jurisdiction
Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin
currently are named in the Act, but some reservations within certain
of these states are exempted.
C. Optional State Assumption of Jurisdiction
A number of states exercised this option.
Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 285.16 (1989). Subsections 285.17-.18
reserved certain social service and police powers in the Seminole and
Miccosukee tribes.
Idaho.: Idaho Code § 67-5101 to 67-5103 (1989) - limited jurisdic-
tion.
Montana: Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 83-801 to 83-806 (1989) -
sele6ted tribes.
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 37.12.010-.070 (1989). As-
sumption was later restored to the Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish, and
Colville tribes (via retrocession) as to criminal jurisdiction under §§
37.12.100-.140.
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.430 (1989) - now amended to remove
jurisdiction where consent of the tribe is not present.
D. Criminal Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280
Assumption of criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280 afforded
the state the same authority to exercise jurisdiction over crimes within
the reservation as it previously had outside reservation borders. Public
Law 280 criminal jurisdiction assumption extinguishes application of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153, thereby leaving the state courts open to try
all crimes, regardless of the party's race or the locus of the precipitating
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event. Concurrent tribal court jurisdiction exists but is limited by
deference to state law and the sentencing limits (one year/$50,000)
imposed upon tribal courts by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.29
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)) (criminal jurisdiction). See the full text of this
statute in section X(D)(3) of this guide (appendix).
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
1. Areas Exempt from State Assumption of Jurisdiction
(Criminal)
28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1988) (criminal jurisdiction). See the full text
of this statute in section X(D)(15) of this guide. Applicability of this
section of the Act to criminal jurisdiction has had the effect of
protecting treaty rights and preserving Indian trust property.
E. Civil Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)) (civil jurisdiction), See the full text of this
statute in section X(D)(3) of this guide (appendix).
1. Areas Exempt from State Assumption of Jurisdiction (Civil)
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988) (civil'jurisdiction). See the full text of
this statute in section X(D)(3) of this guide.
a) Encumbrance of Property
Santa Rosa Band v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). The Ninth Circuit construed "en-
cumbrance" as used in the exemption section of this act to preclude
application of zoning regulations to Indian reservation trust property.
But see Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324
F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1971). The district court narrowly construed
"encumbrance" as operative only when the title to Indian trust prop-
erty is imperiled.
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 425 P.2d 22 (Wash.
1967). "Encumbrance" was here defined as any-state action which has
the effect of reducing the value of Indian trust property.
25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1992) - asserts that the states cannot regulate
leased trust land except as authorized by regulations adopted by the
Secretary of Interior.
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). These limits apply to criminal
sentencing only.
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b) Hunting And Fishing Rights
The federal government has consistently upheld the right of Native
Americans to hunt and fish pursuant to treaties establishing the res-
ervation as against state attempts to regulate this area. However, the
federal government's plenary power has been exercised to abrogate
treaty hunting and fishing rights when conservation concerns have
arisen.30
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988). This exemption from. assumption
of state jurisdiction states that nothing in the grant shall "deprive any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band or community of any right, privilege,
or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with
respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulation thereof."
Shelley D. Turner, "The Native American's Right to Hunt and Fish:
An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System,
The Effect of European Contact and the Continuing Right to Observe
a Way of Life," 19 N.M. L. Rev. 377 (1989). The author provides a
historical overview that includes analysis of contemporary cases.
Laurie Reynolds, "Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Risk of
Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption," 62 N.C. L. Rev. 743 (1984). The
author appraises cases on hunting and fishing rights as they demonstate
the tensions between tribal sovereignty and state/federal legislation.
John J. McLoone, Comment, "Hunting and Fishing Rights," 10
Ariz. L. Rev. 725 (1968). This comment focuses primarily on Depart-
ment of Game v. Puyallup Tribe3 and other cases discussing the
jurisdiction of state courts regarding hunting and fishing rights.
F. State Retrocession of Jurisdiction to the Federal Government
Retrocession by the state of jurisdiction over Indian country and
parties acquired under Public Law 280 is possible under 25 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (1988). However, Indian nations are not able to initiate directly
the retrocession process; their only recourse in this regard is to petition
either the state legislature or the Secretary of the Interior to exert
influence upon the state to institute retrocession legislation.
Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)). See the full text of this statute in section
X(d)(7) of this guide (appendix).
Exec. Order No. 11,435, 50 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (1968) - empowers
the Secretary of the Interior to either accept or deny the proposed
retrocession.
30. See, e.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), modified,
Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979) (fishing); United States v. Dion, 476
U.S. 734 (1986) (hunting).
31. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
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United States v. Lawrence, 595 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth
Circuit held that validity of the Secretary's acceptance of the retro-
cession posited by the state is a matter of federal law. Therefore,
acceptance by the Secretary validates the retrocession.
Omaha Tribe of Nebraska v. Village of Walthill, 460 F.2d 1327 (8th
Cir. 1972). The Eighth Circuit held retrocession in this case to be valid
even though the acceptance by the Secretary of Interior deviated from
that offered by the state.
G. States That Have Retroceded Jurisdiction
Nebraska: 35 Fed. Reg. 16,598 (1970) - affected only portions of
the Omaha reservation within Thurston County.
Nevada: 40 Fed. Reg. 27,501 (1975) - affected various tribes.
Minnesota: 40 Fed. Reg. 4,026 (1975) - affected Boise Fort reser-
vation.
Washington: 34 Fed. Reg. 14,288 (1969) - affected the Quinalt
reservation.
Washington: 37 Fed. Reg. 7,353 (1972) - affected Port Madision
reservation.
Wisconsin: 41 Fed. Reg. 8,516 (1976) - affected the Menominee
tribe.
IV. Criminal Jurisdiction Within Indian Country
A. Introduction
Criminal subject matter jurisdiction within Indian reservations has
crystallized to a greater degree than has civil jurisdiction within Indian
country. 32 The reason for increased clarity revolves around definitive
federal statutes and case law which define broad areas of jurisdiction.
This does not imply that all jurisdictional tensions between the three
tribunals have been solved, nor that the inquiry is simplistic, 3 3 but
simply that this area is, relatively speaking, more clearly defined. The
following analysis of criminal jurisdiction assumes that Public Law
280 is not operative; further, there are crimes that are national in
scope that transcend state and reservation borders34 that have not been
factored in to the analysis.
B. Federal, Tribal, and State Court Jurisdiction - Criminal
1. Major Crimes
a) Indian Defendant and Indian Victim
Major Crimes Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)). The Act, which
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
33. For example, Public Law 280 inquiry still attaches.
34. For example, treason and mail theft.
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represented an unfavorable reaction to Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S.
556 (1883), established federal jurisdiction over six major crimes.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction is present if the alleged perpetrator is a
Native American, regardless of whether the act was committed against
an Indian or non-Indian. Further, it is irrelevant whether the crime
was committed on- or off-reservation. No immunity was granted to
Indians who had been tried for the same crime in a tribal court,
therefore inferring that the federal courts were assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over these crimes. Even though it is arguable that the
federal courts share jurisdiction with tribal courts over the listed crimes,
the tribal court's limited sentencing power effectively has relegated the
tribal courts to misdemeanor actions in the criminal sphere. The Act
implicitly left jurisdiction over lesser offenses within the purview of
the tribal courts. The list of major crimes covered now numbers
thirteen.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 827 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988)). The Act supplements section 1153, stating
that "[a]ll Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph
of and punishable under section 1153 (relating to offenses committed
within Indian country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts
and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such
offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." For the
legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949),
reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
Robert N. Clinton, "Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective," 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 951 (1975).
The author competently provides extensive treatment of the history of
criminal jurisdiction from 1776 through 1975. Major headings of the
article are as follows: "The Treaty Period: 1776-1871," "The Statutory
Period: 1871-Date," "Indian Criminal Jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court: The 19th Century Experience," "Crow Dog and Kagama:
Jurisdiction Over Intra-Indian Crime," and "Jurisdictional Problems
in the Late 19th Century." Clinton observes the complex, noninte-
grated manner in which this body of law has unfolded. See also
Clinton's followup article, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:
A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze," 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503
(1976).
Tim Vollmann, "Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal
Sovereignty and Defendant's Rights in Conflict," 22 Kan. L. Rev. 387
(1974). Vollmann discusses the right, or lack thereof, of Indian defen-
dants to receive jury instructions on, or to plead to, lesser included
offenses in federal court under Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205
(1973).
Charles T. DuMars, Comment, "Indictment Under the Major Crimes
Act - An Exercise in Unfairness and Unconstitutionality," 10 Ariz. L.
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Rev. 691 (1968). The author argues that Indians receive unfair treat-
ment under the act for various reasons including, among other con-
siderations, differing standards for the proof of evidence contingent
upon where, within the same reservation, the act occurred.
Larry A. Burns, Note, "Criminal Jurisdiction: Double Jeopardy in
Indian Country," 6 Am. Indian L. Rev. 395 (1978). The author
describes the potential for double jeopardy given the ramifications of
United States v. Wheeler,35 where an Indian was convicted of disorderly
conduct by a tribal court and subsequently charged in the federal
court, in reference to the same incident, with carnal knowledge of a
female under the age of 16.
b) Indian Defendant and Non-Indian Victim
See (a) above, as the analysis is commensurate.
c) Non-Indian Defendant and Indian Victim
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988)). The Act calls for exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts for crimes of this nature. Intra-racial crimes
between Indians committed on Indian land are specifically exempted
under this statute. For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep.
No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
Assimilative Crimes Act, Act of July 7, 1898, ch. 576, § 2, 30 Stat.
717 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)). The Act applies
state criminal law to supplement areas where there is no federal
criminal statute specifically addressing the action in question. Specif-
ically, this enactment makes criminal offenses committed in any place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, "not prohibited or provided
for by any law of the United States, subject to punishment in accor-
dance with the laws of the state in which such place is situated."
Given that this statute is tied to 18 U.S.C. § 1152, discussed supra, it
applies only to inter- and not intra-racial crimes.
Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946). The Court affir-
matively held that the Assimilative Crimes Act was applicable to this
category of criminal activity through reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
However, the Act may not be used to allow application of conflicting
state law when Congress has a pre-existing statute defining the offense
in question. See infra Victimless or Consensual Crimes in section IV(C)
of this guide.
d) Non-Indian Defendant and Non-Indian Victim
Though the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 includes this area
of crime and, therefore, suggests federal court jurisdiction, judicial
35. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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activism in the area has reserved criminal actions by non-Indians
against other non-Indians for exclusive state court adjudication.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). The Court held
that the State of Colorado, and not the federal courts, had exclusive
jurisdiction to hear a case where a non-Indian is accused of murdering
another non-Indian in Indian country. This was contrary to precedent
which placed jurisdiction of non-Indian-versus-non-Indian crime within
the exclusive province of the federal courts. The Court based this
result on Congress' failure to require a disclaimer of jurisdiction over
Indian lmd within its territory in Colorado's Enabling Act. Implicitly,
this could have foreshadowed the assumption of state jurisdiction over
Indian country, due to the mere lack of a disclaimer provision in the
state's enabling act. Subsequent holdings have confined McBratney to
non-Indian-versus-non-Indian crimes.
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). As with McBratney,
this Court held that Montana state courts, and not the federal courts,
have jurisdiction to hear a murder case involving a non-Indian victim
and a non-Indian defendant. What is noteworthy is the fact that the
reasoning relied on in justifying the McBratney decision (lack of a
disclaimer in Colorado's Enabling Act) was not present in Draper, as
Montana's Enabling Act did contain a disclaimer. Accord New York
ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
2. Other Crimes
a) Indian Defendant and Indian Victim
Non-major crimes are specifically excluded from jurisdiction granted
to the federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Consequently, when a
minor crime is alleged involving only Indians, the tribal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction.
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The Supreme Court held that
the tribal court could not assert jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian
even though the defendant was a Native American, and the alleged
act occured on the reservation.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988)). Intraracial crimes between Indians com-
mitted on Indian land are specifically exempted under this statute. For
the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949),
reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
b) Indian Defendant and Non-Indian Victim
Federal and tribal courts share concurrent jurisdiction over this
category of crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
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Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988)). For the legislative history of this act, see
H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No.
303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1248.
c) Non-Indian Defendant and Indian Victim
Given that tribal courts are devoid of jurisdiction to try a non-
Indian for crimes of any nature under McBratney6 and its progeny,
the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over these actions under
18 U.S.C. § 1152.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1988)). For the legislative history of this act, see
H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No.
303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong.
Serv. 1248.
d) Non-Indian Defendant and Non-Indian Victim
Long-standing case law precedent has carved out exclusive state
court jurisdiction in this area.
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). See supra section
IV(B)(1)(d) of this guide.
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). See supra section
IV(B)(1)(d) of this guide.
Paul S. Volk, Note, "The Legal Trail of Tears: Supreme Court
Removal of Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Crimes by and Against
Reservation Indians," 20 New Eng. L. Rev. 247 (1984-85). The author
delineates the contemporary implications of removal from the tribal
courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing offenses
in Indian country. The consequences discussed include the prevailing
lack of enforcement by state and federal courts and the propagation
of the assumption that tribal courts are inferior in their capacity to
dispense equitable criminal justice to non-Indians.
Carol A. Mitchell, Note, "Oliphant v. Schlie: Tribal Criminal Ju-
risdiction of Non-Indians," 38 Mont. L. Rev. 339 (1977). The author
examines the implications of Oliphant.
T. Christopher Kelly, Note, "Indians - Jurisdiction - Tribal Courts
Lack Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Offenders - Oliphant v. Suqua-
mish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)," 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 537. The
author provides a comprehensive casenote addressing the policy con-
siderations at tension in the decision and the practical consequences
of the holding.
36. See supra § IV(B)(1)(d) of this guide.
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C. Vicimless or Consensual Crimes
1. Committed by Indians
These crimes usually will be defined by state law. However, these
crimes are not "assimilated" under 18 U.S.C. § 13, when both the
plaintiff and the defendant are Indians. In this case, jurisdiction should
reside exclusively in the tribal courts. However, when non-Indians are
involved, state court jurisdiction may attach.
Compare United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), with the
general proposition as stated supra.
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916). Prosecution for adul-
tery involving Indians lies within the jurisdiction of tribal courts.
United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950). This court
allowed state court jurisdiction over an Indian defendant regarding
operation of a slot machine where the defendant procured a tribal
license for the machine. This holding is unusual, and the case would
probably be decided differently today. See Wheeler above.
2. Committed by Non-Indians
See section IV(B)(2)(d) of this guide. Analysis is the same.
1. Criminal Jurisdiction Outside of Indian Country
Indians; are amenable to state court jurisdiction for crimes committed
off the reservation and within the state's boundaries in the same
fashion as are residents of that state. This conclusion attaches even
when the crime involves an offense by one Indian against another
Indian as long as the act took place off the reservation.
Petition of Fox, 376 P.2d 726 (Mont. 1962). The Montana Supreme
Court held that the state court had jurisdiction over this check forgery
case, even though the check was obtained from an Indian agency office
and the check belonged to a member of the tribe, because the allegedly
forged check was cashed outside of the reservation.
State v. La Barge, 291 N.W. 299 (Wis. 1940). A Chippewa Indian
was held to be subject to state court jurisdiction, concerning violation
of hunting laws on land outside of the reservation but within land
ceded to the tribe by treaty.
Ex Parte Moore, 133 N.W. 817 (S.D. 1911). State court jurisdiction
was upheld even though both parties are Indians.
Compare State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 1977). State
court jurisdiction was upheld here even though the Indian defendant
never physically left Indian country. The defendant was held construc-
tively to have been present outside Indian country for the purpose of
this offense - he was shooting from within Indian country at a





Precise delineation of the jurisdictional bounds of civil subject matter
jurisdiction within Indian country is virtually impossible. The main
source of the conflict revolves around the degree to which state courts
have jurisdiction over causes of action that arise within the reservation.
Various analytical constructs have been proffered and utilized by the
courts to determine when a state court may assert power over reser-
vation based causes of action; the history of the tribal/state court
relationship chronicles a sustained effort on the part of the state to
assert jurisdiction. Though federal statutes have clarified the subject
matter bounds between the tribal and state courts as to certain areas
of law, the bulk of civil jurisdiction is determined by case law "tests"
that are subject to broad interpretation. As always, the researcher must
inquire whether Public Law 280 has conferred jurisdiction in the first
instance.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959). Williams is the seminal
case in the area of state civil jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
country. The Court denied state courts jurisdiction to hear a claim by
a Non-Indian against an Indian for the purchase price of goods sold
on the reservation. The court established the oft-quoted analysis as
involving the query whether "the state action infringed on the right
of [the] reservation Indian to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." This analytic approach subsequently has been termed the "in-
fringement" analysis. This case holds that a non-Indian may not assert
a civil cause of action against an Indian in state court for a transaction
that occurred within Indian country.
Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). This case alleges to restrict
the Williams infringement test. The Court in Kake Village asserted
that a state may assume civil jurisdiction as long as the exercise of
jurisdiction does not directly interfere with tribal government. How-
ever, most courts employ the Williams test in a broader fashion.
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). In
Kennerly, the Court appears to break with the Williams infringement
analysis to ask simply whether the state in issue had been granted
jurisdiction by federal statute or treaty (e.g., by Public Law 280). If
the state had not been granted jurisdiction explicity by one of these
vehicles, the state could not exercise civil jurisdiction where a non-
Indian plaintiff was suing an Indian defendant for a cause of action
that arose in Indian country. This position would grant an even larger
measure of deference to tribal forums than would Williams, however.
As stated above, the language in Williams provides the analytical frame
for most recent opinions.
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McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The
Court clarified the instances where infringement analysis is appropriate
and affirmed Kennerly by stating that the balancing of state and tribal
interest is appropriate only when the state is asserting jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Indian country. If state courts are to have jurisdiction
over Indian defendants where the plaintiff -is a non-Indian and the
cause of action arose in Indian territory, then authority for this exercise
of power must be grounded in an express grant of jurisdiction by
either federal statute or treaty.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Fort Berthold II). The Court held
that Indian tribes and individual Indian plaintiffs have a right to sue
non-Indians in state court, regardless of whether the cause of action
arose on or off the reservation. Consequently, the state court may not
deny jurisdiction.
Indian Civil Rights Task Force, "Development of Tripartite Juris-
diction in Indian Country," 22 Kan. L. Rev. 351 (1974). This article
catalogues and discusses the seminal cases and legislation that have
shaped contemporary jurisdiction through 1974.
Sandra Hansen, "Survey of Civil Jurisdction in Indian Country
1990," 16 Am. Indian L. Rev. (1991). Hansen provides a historical
introduction which leads into a discussion of the basics of civil juris-
diction, involving a wide spectrum of interests including divorce, chil-
dren, probate, water rights, taxation, etc.
B. Federal
1. General
Indians have access to the federal courts for redress in a civil action
if the action entails a federal question or the parties have diversity of
citizenship. Given that, for diversity purposes, an Indian is deemed a
"citizen" of the state in which he or she resides, an Indian may not
sue a non-Indian of the same state upon diversity jurisdiction. Also,
the amount in controversy ($50,000.01) requirement must be satisfied.
Finally, federal courts will require a defendant in a tribal action to
exhaust tribal court remedies once suit is pending before the tribal
court.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, para. 1, 36 Stat. 1091 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)). The Act addresses "federal question"
basis for assertion of jurisdiction by federal district courts. Given the
specific grant of jurisdiction to the federal judiciary in federal question
matters involving Indian tribes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). This
section confers jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear federal
question suits brought by individual Native Americans.
Act of Oct. 10, 1966, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1988)). The Act specifically authorizes the tribe to bring suit on federal
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question grounds in the federal district court. See the full text of this
statute in the appendix to this guide. For the legislative history of this
act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted
in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, and S. Rep. No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966). The reports state that the purpose of this act is to provid&
that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band ... wherein the matter
in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, para. 1, 36 Stat. 1091 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)) - general diversity of citizenship statute.
Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth
Circuit held that neither federal question nor diveristy jurisdiction may
be invoked on sole ground that the cause of action arose in Indian
country or due to the fact that one party is an Indian and the other
non-Indian, where both reside in the same state and the cause of action
arose under state law.
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). A federal
court refused to hear a diversity case when a commensurate action
was pending in the tribal court. The district court, as a matter of
comity, will stay proceedings so that the tribal court may determine
jurisdiction in the particular case. This deference to the tribal system,
where an Indian is suing a non-Indian, is arguably transferable to the
state context as well. However, the Court's language in Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering37 casts
doubt on this application. See also Wellman v. Chevron, Inc., 815
F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
2. Divorce, Adoption, Child Custody, and Probate
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Therefore,
Congress must grant courts jurisdiction by statute and in conformity
with Article III of the United States Constitution. The Congress has
not conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts over divorce, adoption
and child custody, or probate proceedings. However, the federal gov-
ernment, through the Department of the Interior, does oversee probate
of trust properties.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 36 Stat. 855 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 372 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Act grants power
to the Department of Interior to oversee probate of trust properties.
25 C.F.R. § 152; 43 C.F.R. § 4 (1989) - regulations giving force
to 25 U.S.C. § 372.
Antonina Vaznelis, "Probating Indian Estates: Conqueror's Court
Versus Decedent Intent," 10 Am. Indian L. Rev. 287 (1982). Vaznelis
37. 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984) (Fort Berthold 1).
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explores the history and existing problems confronting subject matter
jurisdiction in Native American probate cases. A helpful practitioners
guide (concise table) appears at page 306.
C. State
1. General
The general rules of jurisdiction under Williams38 establish that state
courts have no power to hear suits brought by non-Indians against
Indians for civil causes of action that arise on the reservation. Con-
sequently, it follows, a fortiori, that state courts have no jurisdiction
to hear civil suits that arise between Indians within Indian country.
Given that state courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to hear
cases such as these that arguably infringe upon reservation Indians'
"right to make their own laws and be governed by them," parties
cannot consent to the state court's jurisdiction. Finally, Indians may
sue non-Indians in state court regarding actions that have their genus
on the reservation.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959). See supra section
VII(A) of this guide.
Liberty v. Jones, 782 P.2d 369 (Mont. 1989). The Montana Supreme
Court held that state courts did not have jurisdiction over cause of
action in tort involving an Indian plaintiff and defendant when action
arose on the reservation.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Fort Berthold 11). The Court held
that Indian plaintiffs may sue non-Indians in state court, regardless
of whether the cause of action arose on or off the reservation.
Johnson v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 631 P.2d 548 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981). The court of appeals held that a wrongful death action
may be heard in state court where the decedent was an Indian working
for a non-Indian corporation operating in Indian country.
Security State Bank v. Pierre, 511 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1973). The
Montana Supreme Court held that a state court may not commence a
cause of action where the nonmember plaintiff seeks recovery from
cause of action arising within the reservation. This case provides an
excellent history and analysis of the jurisdictional parameters between
Montana and the tribes within its borders.
William C. Canby, Jr., "Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reser-
vation," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 206. Canby, author of American Indian
Law in a Nutshell, summarizes jurisdictional issues arising within
Indian country through 1973.
John F. Sullivan, Comment, "State Civil Power Over Reservation
Indians," 33 Mont. L. Rev. 291 (1972). The author explains state
jurisdiction over civil actions when the events precipitating the cause
of action occur on Indian land and one of the parties is an Indian.
38. See supra § VII(A) of this guide.
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James L. Huemoeller, Note, "State Jurisdiction on Indian Reser-
vations, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S.
463 (1976)," 13 Land & Water L. Rev. 1035 (1978). This note traces
state/tribal court jurisdictional history and then explores the implica-
tions of Moe. The commentator asserts that allowing states to require
Indians to tax non-Indian customers on cigarette sales and authorizing
the states to collect the taxes withheld signals a breakdown in the
burgeoning reassertion of Indian sovereignty.
Thomas J. Lynaugh, "Developing Theories of State Jurisdiction
Over Indians: The Dominance of Preemption Analysis," 38 Mont. L.
Rev. 63 (1977). Lynaugh primarily discusses Moe v. Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes39 and Fisher v. District Court,40 to assert
that the Supreme Court has displaced the "balancing doctrine" of
Williams with a preemption analysis. The preemption analysis asks
whether the state has been conferred jurisdiction under a federal statute
or treaty, or whether the exercise of jurisdiction infringes upon tribal
interests sufficiently so as to outweigh the states' interest in asserting
jurisdiction.
2. Divorce
Jurisdictional queries concerning divorce actions have traditionally
focused upon the residence of the parties. Courts addressing jurisdic-
tion over divorce actions involving Indians also consider the domicile
of the parties involved. Generally, state courts are without subject
matter jurisdiction to hear divorce actions when both parties to the
divorce are Indians and live within the outside borders of the reser-
vation. These actions lie exclusively within the purview of tribal court
jurisdiction. Conversely, even when the action is between Indians,
when both parties reside outside of Indian country, state courts may
grant the divorce decree .4
Additionally, state courts may entertain a divorce action between
non-Indians if both reside on Indian land. When one of the Indian
spouses resides off the reservation and the other within Indian country,
the tribal and state courts arguably have concurrent jurisdiction. Less
settled is the situation involving interracial divorce. The infringement
analysis of Williams would seem to dictate that state courts should
not allow a non-Indian to use the state courts to terminate a union
with an Indian living on the reservation. However, courts traditionally
have focused upon the plaintiff's residence in divorce actions when
discerning their capacity to hear the case. This area of the law is not
39. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
40. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
41. William C. Canby, Jr., Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973
UTAH L. REv. 206, 227-29.
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defined, and disparate jurisdictional holdings have been obtained.
Leon v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). The court
of appeals held that the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a divorce
and custody case where the defendant is a member of tribe and subject
to personal jurisdiction; the state court must recognize the tribal court's
holding.
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982). Sheppard in-
volved divorce proceedings between a non-Indian husband and an
Indian wife.
Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 657 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1982). The New Mexico
Supreme Court held that an Indian husband submitted to jurisdiction
of state court when he filed a counterclaim; his wife was a non-Indian.
But see Revised Law and Order Code of the Colorado River Indian
Tribes (Ariz.) ch. 2, § 1 (1989), which allows for tribal court jurisdic-
tion in divorce actions when either defendant resides on the reservation.
3. Adoption and Child Custody
This area of subject matter jurisdiction is pervasively covered 42 by
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. 41 This act provides for exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction over adoption and child custody when the
child resides on the reservation and when the child is a ward of the
tribal court. Even when the Indian child resides off reservation, and,
therefore, state courts are capable of hearing the action, the tribe or
parents of the child have the option to have the proceeding transferred
to the tribal court in foster care placement and termination of parental
rights actions. This act reflects the obvious preference for placement
of Indian children with adult Indian parents or guardians in an attempt
to preserve the cultural integrity of Indian nations.
Act of Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-
1963 (1988)). See especially 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902-1921 (1988).
Diane Allbaugh, Note, "Tribal Jurisdiction over Indian Children:
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v., Hollyfield," 16 Am. Indian
L. Rev. 533 (1989). Allbaugh gives an overview of tribal jurisdiction
regarding Indian children welfare cases, culminating in an analysis of
the impact of the Supreme Court's decision .in the instant case. The
Choctaw tribal court was held to have exclusive jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings of Indian children, even though the natural
parents of the child made a conscious decision to have the child off-
reservation.
Joan Heifetzer Hollinger, "Beyond the Best Interest of the Tribe:
The Indian Child Welare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children,"
42. Excepting custody decisions within divorce. See supra § VI(E) of this guide.
43. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988)).
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66 U. Det. L. Rev. 451 (1989). For jurisdiction materials, see pages
460-61, 481-91.
See also Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, § 101(a), (c), (d), 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a), (c), (d) (1988); Ind. Code § 34-1-57-25 (1982).
Bruce Davies, "Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act," 16
Clearinghouse Rev. 179 (1982). The author discusses the background,
major provisions, policies, application, and acceptance of the act,
concluding that it is a valuable piece of legislation.
Jesse Trentadue and Myra A. DeMontigny, "The Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: A Practitioners Perspective," 62 N.D.L. Rev.
487 (1986). The authors assert that the dictates of the Act are not
being observed in practice. This work explains the requisites of com-
pliance, including jurisdictional and procedural matters.
4. Probate
State courts entertain probate actions where Indian decedents were
domiciled off the reservation and where non-Indian decedents were
domiciled on the reservation and the heirs of the non-Indian are non-
Indian. Other combinations potentially call into play the Williams
infringement test (e.g., when a non-Indian decedent resided on reser-
vation and left Indian heirs), but pragmatically, many tribal courts
assert jurisdiction only when the decedent is a member of that partic-
ular tribe."
William C. Canby, Jr., "Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reser-
vation," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 206, 229-32. Canby covers probate juris-
diction. See supra section II(J)(2)).
William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 156-57




Williams established that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over suits against Indians4s arising in Indian country. Tribal courts
share concurrent jurisdiction with state courts when an Indian sues
another Indian for an action arising outside Indian country; when an
Indian sues a non-Indian in Indian country; and, arguably under
Williams, when a non-Indian brings an action against an Indian for a
cause of action arising outside the reservation. The state courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indian-versus-non-Indian suits regard-
44. See, e.g., NAv yo Tam. CODE tit. 7, § 253(3) (Supp. 1984-85).
45. See discussion supra section II(K)(3) of this guide (member/nonmember con-
troversy).
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less of where they arise and over actions by Indians against non-
Indians arising off the reservation.
See supra section VI(C)(1) of this guide for applicable cases and law
reviews.
See also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
The Court held that a tribal court may decide its own jurisdiction in
the first instance and that "[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-
Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty
... [and] [c]ivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in
the tribal courts. .... "
Guardianship of M. Sasse, 363 N.W.2d 209, 211 (S.D. 1985). The
South Dakota Supreme Court held that the threshold jurisdictional
test to determine whether a state court has subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear a civil action between enrolled members of an Indian tribe is
whether the state court action infringes on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.
Richard B. Collins, "Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of
Indian Tribes," 54 Wash. L. Rev. 479 (1979). The article focuses on
the authority of Indian tribes to make and enforce (through tribal
courts) civil laws applicable to non-Indians within Indian country after
Oliphant.
2. Divorce, Adoption and Child Custody, and Probate
See supra sections VI(C)(2) (divorce), VI(C)(3) (adoption and child
custody), and VI(C)(4) (probate) of this guide. The analysis and rele-
vant materials are covered in those sections.
E. Indian Child Custody Within Divorce
Application of Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980). Bertelson is
an interesting case that involves a child custody dispute regarding a
part-Indian child, a non-Indian mother, and Indian paternal grand-
parents of the Chippewa Cree Tribe. The court afforded extensive
jurisdictional treatment to this unique fact pattern.
Barbara Atwood, "Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and
Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity," 36 UCLA L. Rev. 1051 (1989).
The article states that, given that the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 does not apply to "an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody
to one of the parents,"" the appropriate forum for the resolution of
Indian child custody disputes between parents is an open, emotional,
and complicated jurisdictional area. This author provides comprehen-
sive treatment of the subtleties of this subject and, along with reviewing
the basic jurisdictional parameters between the tribal and state courts,
contends that where the state and tribal courts have concurrent juris-
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
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diction, that comity should be exercised in recognizing the foreign
decree. Additionally, commensurate with prevailing policy objectives,
the author asserts that the tribal courts should be granted preferred
status in the instance of concurrent jurisdiction.
VII. Water Rights Forums
The federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate water
rights until the "McCarren" amendment vested concurrent jurisdiction
in state courts.
Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 651, tit. II, § 208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988)). The Act allows joinder of the
U.S. in adjudication of water rights.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Winters established
that Native Americans had implied reserved water rights. Here, the
Indians had implied rights to water necessary for irrigation.
State v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Res-
ervation, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985). The Montana Supreme Court
held that state courts must follow federal law respecting substantive
Indian and federal rights reserved under federal law. However, the
cause of action may be heard in state court.
Western States Water Council, Indian Water Rights in the West;
Study for the Western Governors Association (1984). This work focuses
on the quantity of Indian water rights and the methods uged to quantify
those rights.
Richard L. Foreman, Indian Water Rights: A Public Policy and
Administrative Mess (1981). The main body of this work contains
annotations of the significant Native American water rights cases, and
an appendix includes a chronology of the major cases in this area.
VIII. Disputes over Property Held in Trust for Native Americans
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of disputes over property
held in trust for Indians under 25 U.S.C. §§ 345-346 (1988) and 28
U.S.C. § 1353 (1988).
Department of Public Works v. Agli, 472 F. Supp 70 (D.C. Alaska
1979). The district court confirmed that state courts do not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to possession or ownership of interests
in property held in trust for Alaska natives.
IX. History of Major Federal Legislation, Reports, and Case Law
Defining Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Congressional Assumption of
Power Under the Constitution
Proclamation of King George III of Oct. 7, 1763, 4 Indian Affairs,
Laws and Treaties 1172 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1924). The procla-
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mation reserved power to regulate Indian affairs in the Crown, not
with the colonists.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress assumed plenary power over
Indian tribes via this clause, which authorized Congress to regulate
trade with Indians. It remains the foundation of Congress' power to
date.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This clause authorizes the president
to make treaties with Native Americans. Though relevant through the
late 1800s when many treaties were negotiated, federal statutory law
has replaced the treaty process as the means to determine the U.S./
Native American relationship. Many of the treaties contained jurisdic-
tional provisions, but some were not well defined as to particular
application. See, especially, Treaty with the Miami Indians, June 5,
1854, art. 9, 10 Stat. 1097.
Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§ 5-6, 1 Stat. 138. The Act provided
a federal forum applying state and territorial criminal law against non-
Indians who trespassed on Indian land.
Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 4, 6, 1 Stat. 470-71. The Act added
penalties for robbery, larceny, trespass, and murder to the Act of July
22, 1790.
Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, §§ 1-3, 3 Stat. 383. The Act provided
jurisdiction to the federal courts over offenses committed by Indians.
However, this law excluded crimes committed by Indians against other
Indians on Indian land and did not negate any prior jurisdictional
relationships established by treaty. This statute was a precursor to 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). In this
case, Justice Marshall characterized the Cherokees as "a distinct po-
litical society separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself." Specifically, he stated, the tribes were
"domes tic dependent nations" occupying a unique status. This proc-
lamation reflected a period affirming the sovereignty of Indian nations.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Again, in Worces-
ter, Marshall described the Cherokee nation as "a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force.... " (emphasis added).
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846). In
Rogers, Justice Taney recharacterized the status of Indian nations in
terms embracing a diminished sense of sovereignty. Taney stated that
Indian land was "assigned to them [Indians] by the United States, as
a place of domicile for the tribe [which] they hold and occupy ...
with the assent of the United States, and under their authority. Further,
Taney asserted that "Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits
of the United States are subject to their authority, and where the




Congress may by law punish any offence committed there, no matter
whether the offender be a white man or an Indian" (emphasis added)
(an obvious departure from Worcester).
Developments in 1861 - Congress conditioned admittance of ter-
ritories into statehood upon inclusion of disclaimer provisions in the
state's enabling act disclaiming any state jurisdiction over Indian lands
within its boundaries, thus reserving the same to federal and tribal
courts. See, especially, Mont. Const. art. I; Ariz. Const. art. 20, para.
4; Alaska Const. art. XII, § 12.
Developments in 1871 - The treaty period ended. See 25 U.S.C. §
71 (1988).
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Contrary to
precedent granting jurisdiction over non-Indian versus non-Indian crime
within the exclusive province of the federal courts, the Court in
McBratney held that the State of Colorado, not the federal courts,
had exclusive jurisdiction to hear a case where a non-Indian was
accused of murdering another non-Indian in Indian country. The court
based this result on Congress' failure to require a disclaimer of juris-
diction over Indian land within its territory in Colorado's Enabling
Act. Implicitly, this could have foreshadowed the assumption of state
jurisdiction over Indian country due to the mere lack of a disclaimer
provision in the state's enabling act. Subsequent holdings have confined
McBratney to non-Indian versus non-Indian crimes.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). The Court affirmed the
longstanding rule that federal (and, of course, state) courts lacked
jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian on
Indian land.
Major Crimes Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)). The Act, which
represented an unfavorable reaction to Crow Dog, established federal
jurisdiction over six major crimes. Exclusive federal jurisdiction is
present if the alleged perpetrator is a Native American, regardless of
whether the act was committed against an Indian or a non-Indian.
Further, it is irrelevant whether the crime was committed on- or off-
reservation. No immunity was granted to Indians who had been tried
for the same crime in a tribal court, therefore, inferring that the
federal courts were assuming exclusive jurisdiction over these crimes.
However, the Act implicitly left jurisdiction over lesser offenses within
the purview of the tribal courts. The list of major crimes covered now
numbers thirteen.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court in Kagama
upheld federal jurisdiction over a murder case involving an Indian de-
fendant and an Indian victim in a suit challenging the constitutionality
of the Major Crimes Act. Rather than base U.S. authority on U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Court found congressional power to allocate
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jurisdiction to the federal courts as incident to the nature of the Indian/
United States relationship, wherein the tribal nations are characterized
as "wards" of the United States in need of protection from potentially
hostile neighboring states. This decision undermined the sweeping state
jurisdictional implications of Rogers and McBratney.
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 349 (1988)). The Act manifested Congress' attempt to terminate
Indian reservations. The law provided for the allotment of reservation
land to individual Indians. The land was to be held in trust by the
government for twenty-five years, then conveyed to the individual after
that time. The jurisdictional effect of this process was that the Indian
so allotted, or Indians who severed their tribal relationship, became
citizens of the United States, subject, therefore, to the jurisdiction of
state and federal courts in the same fashion as other United States
citizens. The net effect of the program, outside jurisdictional implications,
was the diminution of Indian country from 138 million acres to 48
million acres (20 million of which were either desert or semi-desert lands).
United States v. LeBris, 121 U.S. 278 (1887). Despite the fact that
Minnesota's Enabling Act did not coritain a disclaimer provision denying
jurisdiction over Indian country, contrary to the implication derived from
MeBratney that the absence of a disclaimer conceivably vests jurisdiction
in the state, the Court held in LeBris that Indian reservations within
Minnesota are deemed Indian country subject to federal liquor statutes.
United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577 (1894). The Court held that
federal courts had jurisdiction in an Indian-versus-Indian murder case,
despite the fact that Wisconsin did not have a disclaimer clause.
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). Like McBratney, this
Court held that Montana state courts, not the federal courts, have
jurisdiction to hear a murder case involving a non-Indian victim and a
non-Indian defendant. What is noteworthy is the fact that the reasoning
relied on in justifying the McBratney decision (lack of a disclaimer in
Colorado's Enabling Act) was not present in Draper, as Montana's
Enabling Act did contain a disclaimer.
Talton, v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The Court upheld a tribal court
conviction of an Indian for the murder of another Indian occurring in
Indian country against an assertion that the defendant did not receive
constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. This decision
would seem to confirm concurrent jurisdiction (tribal/federal) over major
crimes committed by Indians against Indians on Indian land. This case
also established that tribal governments are not mandated to extend
United States constitutional guarantees to Native Americans.
Assimilative Crimes Act of 1898, ch. 576, § 2, 30 Stat. 717 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988)). The Act applied state criminal
law to supplement areas where there was no federal criminal statute
specifically addressing the action in question. Specifically, this enactment
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/3
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made "criminal offenses committed in any place under the jurisdiction
of the United States, not prohibited or provided for by any law of the
United States, subject to punishment in accordance with the laws of the
state in which such place is situated .... 
Brookings Institution, Institute for Government Research, The Problem
of Indian Administration (1928). This report delineated the failures of
the allotment act and provided the impetus for the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934.
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-497 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Act
reflected a direct reversal of congressional policy, in that the purpose of
the Act was to stabilize tribal governments and end the alienation of
Indian lands.
Developments in the 1940s - Congressional enactments granted certain
states jurisdiction over particular reservations. See Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 827 (Kansas); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 69 Stat.
229 (North Dakota); Act of June 20, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa);
Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232
(1988) (New York); Act of Oct. 5, 1949, ch. 604, 63 Stat. 705 (California).
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
Congressional tradewinds shifted to a policy of "termination," the aim
of which is to "as rapidly as possible ... make the Indians within the
territorial limits of the United States subject to the same.laws and entitled
to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other
citizens of the United States [and] to end their status as wards of the
United States . . . ." As a result of this policy, many tribes were simply
terminated and their lands sold. See, especially, Act of Sept. 1, 1954,
ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 1099, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 741 (1988)) (Utah);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). DeCoteau
illustrates the effect of termination upon the Lake Traverse Indian
Reservation in South Dakota.
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
1322, 28 U.S.C. 1360 (1988)). The Act granted state civil and criminal
jurisdiction to California, Nebraska, Minnesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and
Alaska (in 1958). Certain reservations in Minnesota and Oregon were
not affected. The Act allowed other states to assume jurisdiction over
tribes through legislative enactment. Tribal consent to assumption of
jurisdiction by the state was not required.
Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1959). The
Tenth Circuit held that suits may not be brought in the federal court
system merely because one of the parties is a Native American. However,
Indian tribes have the right to bring federal question and diversity actions
in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988)). See also Eunice
A. Eichelberger, Annotation, "United States District Court Jurisdiction
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of Action Brought by Indian Tribe Under 28 USCS § 1362," 65 A.L.R.
Fed. 649 (1981).
Williams v. Lee, 258 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959). Williams is the seminal
case in the area of state civil jurisdiction dver Indians in Indian country.
The Court denied state courts jurisdiction to hear a claim by a Non-
Indian against an Indian for the purchase price of goods sold on the
reservation. The court established the oft-quoted analysis as involving
the query whether "the state action infringed on the right of the reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them?" This
analytic approach, subsequently termed the "infringement" analysis, is
the dominant "test" currently employed by the judiciary.
Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). This case alleges to restrict
the Williams infringement test. The Court in Kake Village asserted that
a state may assume civil jurisdiction as long as the exercise of jurisdiction
does not directly interfere with tribal government.
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-03, 82
Stat. 77-78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991)). The ICRA revised Public Law 280 to require tribal
consent to state assumption of jurisdiction. The Act also provided a
mechanism for states to retrocede jurisdiction they had acquired under
Public Law 280. See 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). However, the act also
limits tribal courts sentences (in criminal, not civil, cases) to one year's
imprisonment, $50,000, or both, thereby effectively relegating tribal court
criminal dockets to hearing misdemeanor offenses.
"Proposed Recommendations Relating To The American Indians,"
Message From The President, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Rec.
23,258 (1970). President Nixon proffered what remains contemporary
federal policy toward Indian nations. Nixon recognized and declared that
the government's prior termination policy was ill advised, and he reaf-
firmed the federal government's trust responsibility while affirming and
encouraging Indian autonomy. Examples of legislation passed that was
designed. to implement this vision of United States/Native American
relations, include Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453,
1461-1469, 1481-1498, 1511, 1512, 1521-1524, 1541-1543 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991); Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450, 450a (1988); American Indian Policy Review Commission,
25 U.S.C. § 174 (1988)).
Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). The Court appeared
to break with the Williams infringement analysis to ask simply whether
the state in issue had been granted jurisdiction by federal statute (e.g.,
by Public Law 280) or treaty. If the state had not been granted juris-
diction by one of these vehicles explicitly, then the state could not exercise
civil jurisdiction where a non-Indian plaintiff was suing an Indian de-
fendant for a cause of action that arose in Indian country.
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McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The
Court clarified the instances where infringement analysis is appropriate
and affirmed Kennerly by stating that the balancing of state and tribal
interest is appropriate only when the state is asserting jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Indian country. If state courts are to have jurisdiction
over Indian defendants where the plaintiff is a non-Indian and the cause
of action arose in Indian territory, authority for this exercise of power
must be grounded in an express grant of jurisdiction by either federal
statute or treaty.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The Court
held that tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This
is now black letter law.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (Fort Berthold II). The Court held that
Indian tribes and individual Indian plaintiffs have a right to sue non-
Indians in state court, regardless of whether the cause of action arose
on or off the reservation. Consequently, the state court may not deny
jurisdiction.
Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). The Supreme
Court upheld a lower federal court decision to refuse to hear a diversity
case when a commensurate action was proceeding in the tribal court.
This deference to the tribal system, where an Indian is suing a non-
Indian, is arguably transferable to the state context as well. However,
the Supreme Court's language in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering7 casts doubt on this appli-
cation).
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). The Supreme Court held that
the tribal court could not assert jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian
even though the defendant was a Native American, and the alleged act
occured on the reservation. But see Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1892
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301. (Supp. III 1991)). The Act affirmed tribal
court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians by inclusive language in §
1301(2), (3), (4).
X. Appendix: Federal Statutes of General Scope
and Interpretive Materials
A. Policy
1. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450
(1988))
Congressional statement of findings.
(a) The Congress, after careful review of the Federal Gov-
ernment's historical and special legal relationship with, and
47. 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984) (Fort Berthold 1).
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resulting responsibilities to, American Indian people, finds
that-
(1) the prolonged Federal domination of Indian service
programs has served to retard rather than enhance the progress
of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians
of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to
the realization of self-government, and has denied to the
Indian people an effective voice in the planning and imple-
mentation of programs for the benefit of Indians which are
responsive to the true needs of Indian communities; and
(2) the Indian people will never surrender their desire to
control their relationships both among themselves and with
non-Indian governments, organizations, and persons.
(b) The Congress further finds that-
(1) true self-determination in any society of people is
dependent upon an educational process which will insure the
development of qualified people to fulfill meaningful leader-
ship roles;
(2) the Federal responsibility for and assistance to edu-
cation of Indian children has not effected the desired level of
educational achievement or created the diverse opportunities
and personal satisfaction which education can and should
provide; and
(3) parental and community control of the educational
process is of crucial importance to the Indian people.
Savings Provisions. Provided that:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as -
"(1) affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing
the sovereign immunity from suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe;
or
"(2) authorizing or requiring the termination of any existing
trust responsibility of the United States with respect to Indian
people." Severability. Section 211 of Pub.L. 100-472 provided
that: "If any provision of this Act or the application thereof
to any Indian tribe, entity, person or circumstance is held
invalid, neither the remainder of this Act, nor the application
of any provisions herein to other Indian tribes, entities, per-
sons, or circumstances, shall be affected thereby."
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For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1600, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775, and S.
Rep. No. 682, S. Rep. No. 762, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
B. Indian Country
1. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1151 (1988))
Indian country defined.
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156
of this title, the term "Indian country," as used in this
chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Gov-
ernment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without
the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81stCong., 1st Sess.
(1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
C. Assimilative Crimes Act
1. Act of July 7, 1898, ch. 576, § 2, 30 Stat. 717, 18 U.S.C. § 13
(1988)
Laws of states adopted for areas within federal jurisdiction.
(a) Whoever within or upon any of the places now
existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in
section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which,
although not made punishable by any enactment of Con-
gress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within
the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or Dis-
trict in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty
of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, that
which may or shall be imposed through judicial or admin-
istrative action under the law of a State, Territory, Posses-
sion or District, for a conviction for operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol, shall be
considered to be a punishment provided by that law. Any
limitation on the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
imposed under this subsection shall apply only to the special
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maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
D. Jurisdictional Statutes
1. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988))
Laws governing.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive juris-
diction of the United States, except the District of Colum-
bia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian,
nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured
to the Indian tribes respectively.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1985, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codifed at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1988))
Offenses committed within Indian country.
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian or other person any of the following
offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maim-
ing, a felony under chapter 109A, incesIt, assault with intent
to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery,
and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as
all other persons committing any of the above offenses,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this
section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws
of the State in which such offense was committed as are in
force at the time of such offense.
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For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
Amendment of Sexual Abuse Provisions. Public Law 99-646, §
87(c)(5), 100 Stat. 3623, directed that this section be amended (A) in
the first paragraph, by striking out "rape, involuntary sodomy, carnal
knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age
of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape," and inserting in
lieu thereof "a felony under chapter 109A,"; and (B) in each of the
second and third paragraphs, by striking out "involuntary sodomy."
This amendment was incapable of literal execution in view of the
earlier amendment of this section by Public Law 99-303, May 15,
1986, 100 Stat. 438.
1988 Amendment. Subsection (a) of Public Law 100-690 substituted
"a felony under chapter 109A" for "rape, involuntary sodomy,
felonious sexual molestation of a minor, carnal knowledge of any
female, not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years,
assault with intent to commit rape."
Indian Civil Rights Task Force Memorandum, Reform of the
Federal Criminal: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. X, at 7452-58 (1974). This
memorandum suggested that tribal courts share concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the federal courts over the crimes enumerated in this act.
Joan Kirshberg, Annotation, "What Constitutes Assault 'Resulting
in Serious Bodily Injury' Within the Special Maritime or Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States for Purposes of 18 U.S.C.S. §
113(0, Providing Punishment for Such Act," 55 A.L.R. Fed 895
(1981). The author provides added definition for the crime of "assault
resulting in serious bodily injury" (a crime actionable in federal court
under the Major Crimes Act as above). This annotation (and pocket
part) cites numerous cases involving Indian defendants.
3. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588 (18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1988))
State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against
Indians in the Indian country.
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the follow-
ing table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed
by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed
opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same
extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over
offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory,
and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have
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the same force and effect within such Indian country as
they have elsewhere within the State or Territory:
State or Territory Indian Country Affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State, except
that on Annette Islands, the Metlakatla In-
dian community may exercise jurisdiction over
offenses committed by Indians in the same
manner in which such jurisdiction may be
exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country
over which State jurisdiction has not been
extended
California All Indian country within the State
Minnesota All Indian country within the State, except
the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska All Indian country within the State
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except
the Warm Springs Reservation
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the aliena-
tion, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian
or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in
trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction
against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a
manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement,
or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded
under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to
hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulation thereof.
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this
chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian
country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas
over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), and S. Rep. No. 699, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409. The Senate Report
stated that the purpose of this act was "withdrawal of Federal
responsibility for Indian affairs wherever practicable ... and ...
termination of the subjection of Indians to federal laws applicable
to Indians as such."
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4. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 827 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3242 (1988))
Indians committing certain offenses; acts on reservations.
All Indians committing any offense listed in the first
paragraph of and punishable under section 1153 (relating
to offenses committed within Indian country) of this title
shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner
as are all other persons committing such offense within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), and S. Rep. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1248.
5. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S. C.
§ 1321 (1988))
Assumption by State of criminal jurisdiction.
(a) Consent of United States; force and effect of criminal
laws. The consent of the United States is hereby given to
any State not having jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country situated within such State to assume, with the
consent of the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian
country or part thereof which could be affected by such
assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all
of such offenses committed within such Indian country or
any part thereof as may be determined by such State to
the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over any
such offense committed elsewhere within the State, and
the criminal laws of such State shall have the same -force
and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as
they have elsewhere within that State.
(b) Alienation, encumbrance, taxation, and use of
property; hunting, trapping, or fishing.
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property,
including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by
the United States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize
regulation of the use of such property in a manner incon-
sistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or
with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive
any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of
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any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal
treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trap-
ping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation
thereof.
For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
6. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322 (1988))
Assumption by State of civil jurisdiction.
(a) Consent of United States; force and effect of civil
laws. The consent of the United States is hereby given to
any State not having jurisdiction over civil causes of action
between Indians or to which Indians are parties which
arise in the areas of Indian country situated within such
State to assume, with the consent of the tribe occupying
the particular Indian country or part thereof which would
be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdic-
tion over any or all such civil causes of action arising
within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be
determined by such State to the same extent that such
State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and
those civil laws of such State that are of general application
to private persons or private property shall have the same
force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof
as they have elsewhere within that State.
(b) Alienation, encumbrance, taxation, use, and pro-
bate of property. Nothing in this section shall authorize
the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is
held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States;
or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property
in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agree-
ment, or statute, or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to
adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the own-
ership or right to possession of such property or any
interest therein.
(c) Force and effect of tribal ordinances or customs.
Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter




exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not
inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be
given full force and effect in the determination of civil
causes of action pursuant to this section.
For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
7. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323 (1988))
Retrocession of jurisdiction by State.
(a) The United States is authorized to accept a retroces-
sion by any State of all or any measure of the criminal or
civil jurisdiction, or both, acquired by such State pursuant
to the provisions of section 1162 of title 18, section 1360
of title 28, or section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67
Stat. 588), as it was in effect prior to its repeal by sub-
section (b) of this section.
(b) Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat.
588), is hereby repealed, but such repeal shall not affect
any cession of jurisdiction made pursuant to such section
prior to its repeal.
For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) .
8. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25 U.S. C.
§ 1324 (1988))
Amendment of State constitutions or statutes to remove
legal impediment; effective date.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any enabling act for
the admission of a State, the consent of the United States
is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where
necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as
the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the
assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance
with the provisions of this subchapter. The provisions of
this subchapter shall not become effective with respect to
such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until
the people thereof have appropriately amended their State
constitution or statutes, as the case may be.
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For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
9. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1325 (1988))
Abatement of actions.
(a) No action or proceeding pending before any court
or agency of the United States immediately prior to any
cession of jurisdiction by the United States pursuant to
this subchapter shall abate by reason of that cession. For
the purposes of any such action or proceeding, such cession
shall take effect on the day following the date of final
determination of such action or proceeding.
(b) No cession made by the United States under this
subchapter shall deprive any court of the United States of
jurisdiction to hear, determine, render judgment, or im-
pose sentence in any criminal action instituted against any
person for any offense committed before the effective date
of such cession, if the offense charged in such action was
cognizable under any law of the United States at the time
of the commission of such offense. For the purposes of
any such criminal action, such cession shall take effect on
the day following the date of final determination of such
action.
For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
10. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 80 (codified at 25 U.S. C.
§ 1326 (1988))
Special election.
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter
with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action,
or with respect to both, shall be applicable in Indian
country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected
area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a
majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special
election held for that purpose. The Secretary of the Interior
shall call such special election under such rules and regu-
lations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by
the tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per
centum of such enrolled adults.
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For the legislative history of this act, see S. Rep. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, and
H.R. Rep. No. 473, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
11. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3071 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 (1988))
Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody pro-
ceedings.
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to
any State over any child custody proceeding involving an
Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reser-
vation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is
otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where
an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian
tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
residence or domicile of the child.
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court
In any State court proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to
the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either
parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian
custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such
transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court
of such tribe.
(c) State court proceedings; intervention
In any State court proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian
child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian
child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in
the proceeding.
(d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of Indian tribes.
The United States, every State, every territory or pos-
session of the United States, and every Indian tribe shall
give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to In-
dian child custody proceedings to the same extent that
such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of any other entity.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
128 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7630,
and S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
12. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3074 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1918 (1988))
Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custody proceed-
ings.
(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary
Any Indian tribe which became subject to State juris-
diction pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August
15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by title IV of the Act
of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any
other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, such
tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition
to reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable
plan to exercise such jurisdiction.
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary;
partial retrocession.
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility of
the plan of a tribe under subsection (a) of this section,
the Secretary may consider, among other things:
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a mem-
bership roll or alternative provision for clearly identifying
the persons who will be affected by the reassumption of
jurisdiction by the tribe;
(ii) the size of the reservation or former reser-
vation area which will be affected by retrocession and
reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe;
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or distri-
bution of the population in homogeneous communities 6r
geographic areas; and
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multi-
tribal occupation of a single reservation or geographic
area.
(2) In those cases where the Secretary determines
that the jurisdictional provisions of section 1911(a) of this
title are not feasible, he is authorized to accept partial
retrocession which will enable tribes to exercise referral
jurisdiction as provided in section 1911(b) of this title, or,
where appropriate, will allow them to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction as provided in section 1911(a) of this title over
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limited community or geographic areas without regard for
the reservation status of the area affected.
(c) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Reg-
ister; notice; reassumption period; correction of causes for
disapproval. If the Secretary approves any petition under
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall publish
notice of such approval in the Federal Register and shall
notify the affected State or States of such approval. The
Indian tribe concerned shall reassume jurisdiction sixty
days after publication in the Federal Register of notice of
approval. If the Secretary disapproves any petition under
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall provide
such technical assistance as may be necessary to enable the
tribe to correct any deficiency which the Secretary identi-
fied as a cause for disapproval.
(d) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected
Assumption of jurisdiction under this section shall not
affect any action or proceeding over which a court has
already assumed jurisdiction, except as may be provided
pursuant to any agreement under section 1919 of this title.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
and S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). The House Report
stated that the purpose of this act is to establish minimum federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and,
therefore, to encourage stability and security of Indian tribes. See
also S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
13. Act of Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3074 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1919 (1988))
Agreements between States and Indian tribes.
(a) Subject coverage:
States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into
agreements with each other respecting care and custody of
Indian children and jurisdiction over child custody pro-
ceedings, including agreements which may provide for or-
derly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and
agreements which provide for concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween States and Indian tribes.
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaf-
fected. Such agreements may be revoked by either party
upon one hundred and eighty days written notice to the
other party. Such revocation shall not affect any action
or proceeding over which a court has already assumed
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jurisdiction, unless the agreement provides otherwise.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
and S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
14. .Act of Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3075 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1920 (1988))
Improper removal of child from custody; declination of
jurisdiction; forthwith return of child: danger exception.
Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody pro-
ceeding before a State court has improperly removed the
child from custody of the parent or Indian custodian or
has improperly retained custody after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of custody, the court shall de-
clitne jurisdiction over such petition and shall forthwith
return the child to his parent or Indian custodian unless
returning the child to his parent or custodian would subject
the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat
of such danger.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1386,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
and S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
15. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 589 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988))
State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are
parties.
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall
have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between In-
dians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the
State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction
over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of
such State that are of general application to private persons
or private property shall have the same force and effect
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within
the State:
State of Indian country affected
Alaska All Indian country within the State
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California All Indian country within the State
Minnesota All Indian country within the State, except
the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska All Indian country within the State
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except
the Warm Springs Reservation
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property,
including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by
the United States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize
regulation of the use of such property in a manner incon-
sistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or
with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer
jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate pro-
ceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession
of such property or any interest therein.
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or here-
after adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in
the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall,
if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the
State, be given full force and effect in the determination
of civil causes of action pursuant to this section.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), and S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409.
16. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1988))
Indian tribes.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a
governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
For the legislative history of this act, see H.R. Rep. No. 1507,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145,
and S. Rep. No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., (1966). The Senate
Report stated that the purpose of this act is to "provide that the
district courts are to have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
brought by Indian tribes or bands wherein the controversy arises
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under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." This
provision applies without regard to jurisdictional amount specified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, "United States District Court
Jurisdiction of Action Brought by Indian Tribe Under 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 1362," 65 A.L.R. Fed. 649 (1981).
17. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1852 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (Supp. III 1991)).
(2)"powers of self-government" means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, exec-
utive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, includ-
ing courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed,
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
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